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Abstract 
This paper asks whether a gap in spouses’ subjective happiness matters per se, i.e. whether it 
predicts divorce. We use three large panel surveys to explore this question. Controlling for the 
life satisfaction levels of spouses, we find that a larger happiness gap, even in the first year of 
marriage, increases the likelihood of a future separation. This association even holds for 
couples where both spouses are identified as being better off than in their outside option. We 
interpret this observation as reflecting a concern for relative utility. To the best of our 
knowledge, this effect has not been taken into account by any existing economic models of 
the household.  
The relationship between happiness gaps and divorce is consistent with the fact that couples 
who are unable to transfer utility are more at risk than others. It is also possible that 
assortative mating by happiness baseline level reduces the risk of separation. However, 
assortative mating cannot entirely explain the finding, as a widening of the happiness gap over 
time increases the risk of separation. We also uncover an asymmetry in the effect of happiness 
gaps: couples are more likely to break-up when the difference in life satisfaction is 
unfavorable to the woman. De facto, divorces appear to be initiated predominantly by women 
who are less happy than their husband. This asymmetry suggests that the effect of happiness 
gaps is grounded on motives of relative deprivation, rather than on a preference for equal 
happiness.  
The presence of this new argument in spouses’ utility is likely to modify their optimal 
behavior, e.g. in terms of labor supply. It should also be taken into account for public policy 
measures concerning gender-based labor incentives. 
Keywords: divorce, happiness, comparisons, panel, households, marriage. 
JEL codes: J12, D13, D63, D64, H31, I31, Z13
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1. Introduction  
Are people averse to welfare inequality? Do they make happiness comparisons? And does this 
take place even within couples? Based on three different panel surveys, this paper suggests 
that the answer to each of these questions is yes. Controlling for the level of well-being1 of 
spouses, as well as various characteristics that have been found to be associated with marriage 
stability, we find that a higher happiness difference between spouses increases the risk of 
divorce.  
To the best of our knowledge, the hypothesis that happiness gaps per se (or gaps in utility) 
may exert an influence on the stability of marriages has never previously been explored in the 
literature on marriage, divorce and interactions inside couples.2 The stylized fact that we 
uncover challenges the existing models by proposing a new argument in the utility function of 
spouses, namely relative deprivation. This motive is likely to influence the optimal behavior 
of spouses, e.g. in terms of labor supply, as well as the framework of gender-based public 
policy. 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that people care about the distribution of well-
being per se. Income comparisons, status effects, and aversion to income inequality in 
general, have been widely documented, in the realm of the labor market in particular, but also 
                                                 
1 We use the terms well-being, life-satisfaction and happiness interchangeably in this paper, and we assume that 
these three self-declared mental states are approximations of experienced utility (as opposed to decision-utility, 
which is unobservable, see Kahneman et al., 1997). De facto, these measures are highly correlated. For instance, 
the correlation between self-declared life satisfaction and self-declared happiness, both measured on a 1-10 
scale, is 0.7 in the European Social Survey (waves 2002, 2004 and 2006; see Clark and Senik, 2010). 
2 Although marriages and divorces are private matters, they actually have important implications for economic 
outcomes. For instance, as was suggested by Becker et al. (1977), the prospect of separation reduces the 
incentives of spouses to invest in marriage specific assets such as the number and human capital of children. 
Divorce is also related to the participation of women in the labor market, both as a cause and a consequence. 
Marriage and divorce, and the regulations that relate to them, thus have the potential to influence these important 
aspects of economic life. 
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in society as a whole (see Clark et al., 2008, and Senik, 2009). However, the ultimate interest 
of policy-makers, researchers and human beings in general lies in well-being rather than 
income per se. The usual focus on income is because income, as opposed to well-being, is an 
observable proxy, and is a metric of well-being, not only for researchers, but also in the daily 
experience of workers and citizens. However, in small organizations where people are 
involved into frequent, repeated and long-term relationships, well-being could be observable 
to a certain extent. Couples are obviously an extreme case of this type of situation, and it has 
actually been shown that spouses are able to predict each other’s declared happiness levels 
(Diener 1984; Sandvik et al. 1993). Actually, couples represent one of the rare real life groups 
(as opposed to experimental settings) in which researchers can be quite certain about the 
direction of comparisons that potentially occur between agents. 
The third objective of the paper is to assert the reliability of subjective variables. Showing that 
self-declared happiness actually has a predictive power for decisions and actions can 
strengthen the confidence that it reflects more than the noise produced by mood, social 
desirability biases, framework effects, question ordering and other unessential phenomena. In 
the same spirit, Freeman (1978), Clark (2001), and Kristensen and Westergaard-Nielsen 
(2006) have shown that job satisfaction is a strong predictor of job quits, even when 
controlling for wages, hours of work and other standard individual and job variables. 
We use three longitudinal surveys that contain a life satisfaction question labeled in very 
similar ways: the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP, 1984–2007), the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS, 1996–2007) and the Household, Income and Labor 
Dynamics in Australia Survey (HILDA, 2001–2007). The two former surveys have been used 
extensively by the scientific community, especially in the field of happiness economics.  
We find that a happiness gap between spouses in any given year is positively associated with 
the likelihood that a separation will occur in the following year or in subsequent years. In 
order to mitigate concerns about reverse causation, we show that even a happiness gap in the 
first year of marriage (for couples who were surveyed during their first year of marriage) 
increases the risk of a future separation. The influence of happiness differences is statistically 
significant both for couples who form a new couple after the break-up of their initial union 
and for those who do not. The widening of the happiness gap is also associated with a higher 
risk of divorce. Happiness gaps are associated with a higher risk of future divorce even for 
couples whose utility is higher than what can be deemed to be their outside option.  
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We interpret this finding as resulting from an aversion to unequal sharing of well-being within 
couples. This is consistent with the fact that couples who are unable to transfer utility are 
more at risk than others. It is also possible that assortative mating in terms of happiness 
baseline-level reduces the risk of divorce. However, assortative mating cannot totally explain 
our findings. First, a widening of the happiness gap over time increases the risk of separation. 
Moreover, after controlling for lagged values of the happiness gap, or for the initial value of 
the match (in the first year of marriage), the coefficient on the current happiness gap remains 
statistically significant, which we take as an indication that the effect goes beyond the initial 
quality of the marriage. 
Finally, we uncover an asymmetry in the effect of happiness difference, which is driven 
entirely by women who are less happy than their partner. This suggests that the destabilizing 
effect of happiness gaps is based on a relative deprivation motive, rather than on a pure 
preference for equality (in well-being).  
2. Happiness gaps and divorce in the economic literature 
This paper belongs to the literature on the economic analysis of marriage and divorce. This 
body of literature has focused on the reasons for marriage,3 the causes of marriage instability, 
the behavior of spouses in terms of the demand for goods and supply of labor, and the 
efficiency of the equilibrium in the cases of cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, the literature has barely addressed the issue of the 
difference in spouses’ utility or well-being as such. 
In altruistic household models à la Becker (1974), the head of the household cares for the 
welfare of each member, but not for the equality of welfare among members as such.4 In 
                                                 
3 Marriage is considered as a “partnership for joint production and joint consumption”, such as “producing and 
rearing children” (Weiss, 1997). Other justifications for marriage include the existence of couple-specific 
production technology or complementarity/substitutability between goods. Marriage as a long term arrangement 
is also grounded on the benefits yielded by increasing returns to scale, the division of labor, risk pooling and 
improved coordination between spouses (Weiss, 1997). 
4 Under the assumption of caring preferences, it is true that: “In general, the higher the degree of caring, the 
narrower will be the range of conflict. That is, both partners will agree to delete extremely unequal distributions 
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collective models à la Chiappori (1988, 1992), choices can be described as spouses trying to 
reach the highest collective utility frontier, then choosing a point on the frontier to regulate 
the division. The sharing rule depends on their respective preferences and bargaining power 
(“distribution factors”), with the latter reflecting inter alia spouses’ outside wage, the 
marriage and divorce legislation, child custody rules, the sex ratio on the relevant (re-) 
marriage market, etc. However, the sharing rule does not include a constraint on the degree of 
equality of outcomes. Finally, in the case of non-cooperative models, where members are 
represented as being linked by externalities, but acting non-cooperatively, each person 
determines the variable under her control, taking the decision of her spouse as given: thus, the 
outcome can clearly be distributed very unequally across spouses, depending on their relative 
threat points.  
In all types of models, couple dissolution occurs endogenously when the value of marriage is 
less than the value of divorce to at least one spouse, after possible transfers of utility, i.e. 
“whenever the couple cannot find an allocation within marriage that dominates the divorce 
allocation. This rule for “efficient divorce” holds as long as utility is transferable across 
spouses…” (Weiss, 1997, p. 112). Concretely, transfers of utility can take the form of income 
transfers, compromise, or spillovers of happiness, i.e. contagion. Divorce is efficient when the 
actual value of marriage differs from its expected value. As put by Becker et al. (1997, p. 
1144), “the majority of divorces results from uncertainty and unfavorable outcomes and, 
therefore, would not occur in a world where outcomes could be anticipated”. This is because 
some of the relevant information on the quality of the match is revealed only through time, 
and exogenous shocks inevitably occur subsequent to the formation of the couple. This new 
information influences both the value of the marriage (e.g. emotional intensity, children, 
earnings, health condition, or other characteristics of the spouses) and the value of the outside 
options (including other matches) against which the value of marriage is compared (Weiss, 
1997, Weiss and Willis, 1997). This very brief discussion shows that the economic models of 
                                                                                                                                                        
from the family’s choice set” (Weiss, 1997, p. 93). However, this does not mean that caring spouses will 
necessarily equalize their well-being, and it is not because spouses have a concern for the distribution of 
happiness per se. It is simply because under very unequal distribution of consumption, an equalizing transfer will 
make both partners better off, because the relatively deprived spouse obtains a higher marginal utility of 
consumption, which more than compensates her altruistic partner.  
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marriage do not contain any predictions concerning the relationship between utility gaps 
between spouses and the risk of divorce.  
Of course, when utility is not transferable, non-Pareto-improving divorce can occur5 
following any shock that brings at least one spouse below her outside opportunity. Even 
without a pure concern for happiness inequality, this could lead to an apparent relationship 
between happiness gaps and divorce, because the higher the happiness gap, the more likely it 
is that one of the spouses is below her outside opportunity, if, on average, the benchmark 
utility locus is relatively equally shared between spouses. Hence, the empirical association 
between happiness gaps and divorce could hide the non-transferability of utility. 
However, a clear case where the association between happiness gaps and divorce cannot be 
attributed to the non-transferability of utility (even if utility is not actually transferable) is the 
case where the participation conditions are respected for both spouses. In this case, the 
difference in utility should not be associated with the risk of divorce, unless there really is 
some aversion to happiness discrepancy.  
As has been shown by this discussion, two possible deviations from the classical model can 
explain the empirical association between happiness gaps and divorce: (i) the imperfect 
transferability of utility and (ii) the importance of happiness gaps per se. Although we are 
interested in the second one, we do not consider these two hypotheses as mutually exclusive. 
On the contrary, it is quite plausible that when the utilities of spouses diverge to a large 
extent, this probably indicates that the “identity” of the couple as such has decayed; as a 
result, large happiness gaps likely go hand in hand with greater difficulty of making utility 
transfers. In the same order of ideas, Thompson (2008) suggested that communication 
difficulties can put a marriage at risk, and quoted empirical evidence of this phenomenon. 
Finally, even the clearest case of aversion to happiness discrepancy cannot be understood 
without incomplete transferability of happiness. 
Bringing these predictions to the data, we test the null hypothesis of no association between 
happiness gaps and the risk of divorce. We find that, ceteris paribus, happiness gaps are 
                                                 
5 Although Becker et al. (1977, p. 1145) allege that “the rigidity in […] marital division has been greatly 
exaggerated, and combined maximization is probably the appropriate model”. 
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robustly associated with a greater probability of a future separation, even for spouses whose 
level of utility is higher than their outside option. Our interpretation is that this reflects a 
concern for the distribution of welfare per se. 
Notice that, in the case of non-transferable utility and aversion to happiness inequality, 
couples in which the spouses are similar can be expected to be more stable, as their similar 
personalities, characteristics or choices reduce the scope of conflicts. Hence, positive 
assortative mating is likely to be favorable to the stability of marriage, a relationship that has 
often been observed, and to which we bring a new element of explanation. 
This paper naturally belongs to the happiness literature. The two bodies of literature are not 
totally disconnected: in their 1997 paper, Weiss and Willis used the self-declared happiness of 
spouses as an indicator of the quality of their match. More generally, a series of papers in 
economics and psychology have provided evidence that, compared to remaining single, 
marriage has a positive impact on mental health (Gove et al., 1983), physical health (Wilson 
and Oswald, 2005), life satisfaction (Stutzer and Frey, 2004; Zimmerman and Easterlin, 
2006), and life expectancy (Gardner and Oswald, 2002; Hu and Goldman, 1990). Stutzer and 
Frey (2004) show that the higher happiness of married people is partly due to a selection 
effect (those to-be-married in the future are already happier than those to-remain-single, even 
before they marry), but not entirely. Concerning divorce, using the BHPS, Gardner and 
Oswald (2005) show that “divorcing couples become happier by breaking up”. Hu and 
Goldman (1990), in a longitudinal survey, estimate that divorced males have higher mortality 
rates relative to the married population in Asian countries, North America and Europe. 
However, this could stem from a selection effect, as Stutzer and Frey (2004) find that the 
lower happiness of divorced people was already observable during their marriage. A few 
papers from the same body of literature have tried to address the ideas of altruism and intra-
household externalities of welfare. Powdthavee (2004) has shown evidence of positive 
spillovers of subjective well-being between spouses, using the British Household Panel 
Survey. In a recent paper (Powdthavee, 2009), he also observed that a negative correlation 
between spouses’ subjective well-being is associated with a greater likelihood of divorce. 
Lucas and Schimmack (2006), using the German Socio-Economic Panel, also found  evidence 
of spousal similarity in life satisfaction. In the same spirit, Bruhin and Winkelmann (2009) 
have provided evidence that parents’ self-declared happiness is positively correlated with their 
children’s happiness; more “altruistic” parents actually make higher financial transfer 
payments to their children.  
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Finally, this paper belongs to the body of literature dedicated to the effects of income 
distribution and income comparisons on subjective well-being (see the reviews by Alesina 
and Giuliano, forthcoming; Clark et al., 2008; and Senik, 2009). These studies have 
confronted the difficulty of identifying the direction, intensity and welfare effects of income 
comparisons. As has already been noted, couples represent one of the rare real life groups (as 
opposed to experimental settings) in which researchers can be quite certain about the direction 
of comparisons that potentially occur between agents. With respect to this body of literature, 
the contribution of this paper is to provide evidence of happiness comparisons in the realm of 
within-household interactions. 
The next section presents the data, Section 4 presents the empirical specification, Section 5 
discusses the results and Section 6 concludes. 
3. Data 
We use three large panel surveys, the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP, 1984-2007), 
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS, 1996-2007) and the Household, Income and 
Labor Dynamics in Australia (HILDA, 2001-2007) survey, which all include subjective 
happiness questions and contain information about all adult members within households. 
Descriptive statistics of the regression samples are presented in Table 1. 
Admittedly, the focus of this paper is not on the comparison between Germany, the United 
Kingdom and Australia. Rather, we use these datasets because the BHPS and the GSOEP are 
two of the main panel surveys that have been used in the happiness literature, so that results 
obtained with both sources will have more generality. We also complement these with a more 
recent data set (HILDA), which contains some very useful subjective variables. Conducting 
the same analysis on three data sets separately is one way to include a self-contained 
“replication check” on the validity of the results. Using several datasets also allows exploiting 
complementary pieces of information. For instance, the GSOEP has information on expected 
life satisfaction, whereas HILDA has information about who initiated the divorce, among 
other things.  
For each survey, we construct the regression dataset in the following way: we define as 
observations (rows) women who have been either married or living with a partner at some 
point during the survey. Each woman is matched with her spouse or partner. The variables 
 
10 
(columns) contain the information relative to each woman and to her spouse or partner. The 
total number of observations is thus equal to the number of women times the number of years 
they are surveyed. (We also checked that the results were identical when men were used as 
the unit of observation.) 
3.1 The GSOEP 
The GSOEP6 is a wide-ranging representative longitudinal study of private households, which 
has been conducted annually since 1984. It includes information on objective living 
conditions, as well as on many subjective attitudes. Self-declared happiness (“How satisfied 
are you with your life, all things considered?”) is a categorical variable that takes the values 
0-10 (where 0 is “totally unhappy” and 10 is “totally happy”) and is available for every year 
in the survey. The GSOEP also includes a separate spell dataset for marital status, indicating 
the beginning and ending dates of each marriage spell.  
We restrict the sample to individuals aged 18-65 and exclude transitions into widowhood. 
Thus, our regression sample includes women for whom there are no missing values for the 
variables that show up in the main specification. There are 107,627 such women, of whom 
2,038 separate from their partner at some point between two given years of the survey (1230 
were legally married and 808 were de facto cohabitating). We also observe 899 new 
marriages. For each year, the probability of separation from one’s partner, conditional on 
having a partner in the previous year, is 2.02%.  
3.2 The BHPS 
The BHPS is a longitudinal annual household survey that began in 1991.7 The wording of the 
life satisfaction question that we are using is “How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your 
life overall?” The answers are measured on a scale from 1 (not satisfied at all) to 7 
(completely satisfied). This question about life satisfaction has been asked in all waves since 
1996, with the exception of 2001.  
                                                 
6 For further information on GSOEP, see http://panel.gsoep.de/soepinfo2008/. 
7 Detailed information about the BHPS can be found at http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/survey/bhps. 
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Our regression sample (1996-2007), described in Table 1, contains people who live with a 
partner for at least one year during the observation period and for whom there are no missing 
values for the variables used in the main specification. We restrict the sample to individuals 
aged 18–65 and exclude transitions into widowhood. Hence, it includes 29,296 couples, of 
whom 594 (i.e., 2%) separate at some point between two given years of the survey. Of those, 
the 4,801 couples who cohabit without being legally married have a higher separation rate, 
namely 5.8%.  
3.3 HILDA 
HILDA is a nationally representative Australian household-based panel study, which has been 
run annually since 2001, in order to collect information on economic and subjective well-
being, labor market dynamics and family dynamics in Australia.8 Interviews are conducted 
annually with all adult members of each selected household. Respondents declare their level 
of life satisfaction (All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life? Pick a number 
between 0 and 10 to indicate how satisfied you are. 0: Totally dissatisfied, 5: Neither satisfied 
nor dissatisfied, 10: Totally satisfied). The data include very detailed information on the 
relationships and life events that occur in each year.  
This paper uses the first seven waves of the HILDA survey (2001 to 2007). We consider all 
individuals who have been married or living with a partner for at least one year during the 
survey and whose partner is also identified. Our regression sample contains 19,598 
observations (couples). From 2001 to 2007, we observe 546 separations and 731 new 
marriages.  
The separation rates observed in the three samples coincide with the figures published by the 
respective national statistical offices. The average rate of separation from one year to another 
is around 2%. Of course, this risk accumulates over time: for instance, more than half of the 
couples who were legally married in the first year of each survey had broken-up by 2007 
(50% in BHPS, 54% in HILDA, 65% in GSOEP). 
                                                 
8 See http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/hilda/. 
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In all three databases, women tend to be happier than men (see Table 1). For most couples, 
the difference is relatively small, however. About one third of couples have both spouses 
declaring exactly the same happiness level. A difference of one step (on the happiness ladder) 
is also observed in one third of couples. Hence, a situation of spouses experiencing similar 
levels of happiness is actually predominant. However, the gap tends to be larger in couples 
that will separate one year later. As is shown by the descriptive statistics in Table 1, happiness 
gaps fluctuate around 0 for couples who are still together in the following period, but are 
larger for those who are going to separate. As expected, total happiness is much lower for the 
latter than for the former. People who separate tend to be younger, have a lower household 
income (a lower male income but a higher female income), have fewer children (except in 
BHPS), have a shorter duration of marriage, are less often legally married, and are less 
satisfied with their partner one year before separation. 
4. Empirical specification 
Our main objective is to test the null hypothesis that happiness gaps, as such, do not influence 
the stability of marriage. For this purpose, we set up a  simple framework that integrates the 
usual arguments of marriage and divorce models, and we add the potential effect of the 
happiness gap. We first present the reasoning, then explain how we measure the magnitudes 
of interest.  
4.1 The structure of our test 
Suppose that the frontiers of possible utility for a couple are represented by U0, U1, … in 
Figure 1. This linear functional form implies that utility is transferable at a constant rate, but 
this need not be the case, and the reasoning is the same with quadratic forms of utility 
transfers, i.e. positive or negative curvature of the utility frontiers. Suppose that the outside 
option of a couple is represented by point O on line U0, so that the value of the male outside 
option is UM0, and that of the female outside option is UW0. 
In the -most widespread- cooperative theory of the household, a union efficiently unravels 
whenever its value becomes lower than some benchmark, which can be defined as the outside 
options of spouses, or the initial expected value of marriage, in the spirit of the participation 
constraint (Weiss, 1997). When utility is transferable, the condition for marriage continuation 
is that the set of reachable aggregate utility remains above the aggregate value of outside 
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options: (UMt + UWt) ≥ (UM0 + UW0); i.e., that the utility frontier at period t be located higher 
than U0. For example, if a couple’s utility is as point A on U1, it is better for the husband to 
transfer some utility to his wife (moving to point D or E), rather than to have the outside 
option O. Beyond this condition, there is no reason why the distance between the utility locus 
and the equal utility schedule -represented by the 45° line- should be important for the 
stability of the marriage. Empirically, the implication is that controlling for the marriage 
surplus in year t [ (UMt + UBWt) – (UM0 + UW0) ], there is no reason why a happiness gap in 
period t |UMt – UWt| should be associated with divorce in period (t + 1). Thus, our basic test 
examines the null hypothesis that the coefficient on |UMt – UWt| in the following equation is 
equal to zero:  
Probability of separation t + 1 = f [ (UMt + UWt) - (UM0 + UW0), |UMt – UWt| , XMt, XWt ],  (1) 
where XMt and XWt include the characteristics which have been identified in the literature as 
driving the value of marriage and divorce (see below).  
Of course, the first task of this empirical investigation is to define the value of the outside 
option of each spouse UM0 (male happiness) and UW0 (female happiness). As we do not 
observe these values, we consider several possible concepts of outside options. 
(i) A first possibility is to measure the average value of an individual’s outside option, 
depending on the relevant characteristics uncovered by the empirical literature (see 
Becker et al., 1977; Bumpass and Sweet, 1972; Smock et al., 1999; Weiss and Willis, 
1997), i.e. age, labor income, financial and other assets, education, number of children, 
etc. In this framework, controlling for the variables contained in the vector of socio-
demographic controls XMt and XWt is enough to capture the average effect of UM0 and 
UW0, and the equation to test is simply:  
 Separation t + 1 = f [ (UMt + UWt), |UMt – UWt|, XMt, XWt ].  (1.i) 
(ii) An alternative measure of an individual’s outside option is the average happiness of 
single people of the same age and gender category, as measured in the survey. 
(iii) Finally, the relevant benchmark for someone considering the possibility of divorce 
could be the average level of happiness reached by divorced people a few years after 
their separation. Here, we measure this value three years after separation. 
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The average value of total happiness in outside options (UM0 + UW0) is as follows: (ii) 9.45, 
(iii) 10.07 in BHPS; (ii) 13.84, (iii) 14.02 in GSOEP, and (ii) 15.76, (iii) 15.68 in HILDA.  
We test the null hypothesis that the coefficient on |UMt – UWt| = 0 by estimating equation (1) 
under these different definitions of the outside options UM0 and UW0. 
Additional restrictions 
Of course, the null hypothesis could be rejected either because spouses care about the 
distribution of happiness or because the gap is capturing some other phenomenon (or both). In 
order to narrow the range of interpretations of the finding, we estimate the different versions 
of equation (1) on increasingly restricted samples. 
Firstly, it could be that controlling for the level of aggregate happiness is not enough, because 
the perceived effect of the happiness gap is driven by couples who are below their outside 
option. In order to rule out this risk, we focus on couples whose current aggregate utility is 
greater than their (supposed) outside option (whose utility frontier is above U0), i.e., who 
verify: 
UMt + UWt ≥ UM0 + UW0. (condition 1) 
Under condition (1), if utility is transferable, couples should not break up, so that the effect of 
the happiness gap is well isolated. However, if the null is not rejected even under condition 
(1), it can be because utility is not transferable. It could also be because condition (1) is not 
sufficient to ensure that the participation constraint of each spouse is respected, because the 
slope of the utility frontiers under divorce are different, like U0’ in Figure 1.9. We therefore 
consider the most clear-cut case, corresponding to an even narrower sample, as represented by 
the segment CD on the utility frontier U1, where the utility of each spouse is superior to her 
(supposed) outside option:  
                                                 
9 When utility curves intersect, the terms of utility exchange between wife and husband within and outside 
marriage are different, so that even with the same total utility, there are points of the divorce utility line that are 
out of reach during marriage (and vice-versa). In Figure 1, for all points of U0’ which are located to the left of 
point F, the husband would be unable to compensate his wife for the surplus of utility that she could obtain 
outside marriage. 
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UMt > UM0 and UWt > UW0 (condition 2) 
We thus test equation (1), with the alternative definitions of outside options (ii) and (iii), on 
the increasingly restricted samples that verify conditions (1) and (2). If the tests reject the null 
hypothesis of no association between happiness gaps and divorce, this will not be uniquely 
attributable to the impossibility of transferring utility, as both spouses are above their outside 
option. Hence, this test genuinely addresses the impact of happiness gaps on divorce. 
Admittedly, happiness gaps can only put marriage at risk if utility transfers are difficult; 
otherwise spouses would reallocate total utility. In other words, the test detects the importance 
of happiness gaps in the possible presence of imperfect transferability of utility.  
We also estimate the relationship between the risk of divorce and the evolution of the 
happiness gap on the sub-sample of couples whose happiness gap has increased over time:  
Separation t + 1= f [(UMt + UWt), (|UMt – UAt| – |UM t – 3 – UW t – 3|), XMt, XWt ]  (2) 
To be as restrictive as possible, we estimate equation (2) conditional on:  
UMt ≥ UWt – 3 and UWt ≥UWt – 3.  (condition 3) 
This addresses the following questions: controlling for the level of total happiness, does an 
increase in the happiness discrepancy put the marriage at risk, even when the level of 
happiness of each spouse has increased? In other words, if a couple was at point G at period 0, 
is it more at risk in period t if it stands on segment IH rather than on segment HE (which is 
closer to the diagonal) on line U1? Note that no assumption concerning the value of UM0 and 
UW0 has to be made in this case. 
Robustness tests 
Assortative mating. Our preferred interpretation is that the effect of happiness gaps on 
divorce expresses a concern for relative happiness. However, an alternative explanation could 
be that a wider happiness gap reflects a greater dissimilarity between spouses. Indeed, in the 
case of non-transferable utility, the similarity of spouses in terms of personality and 
preferences reduces the scope of conflicts. Hence, positive assortative mating is likely to 
generate both smaller happiness gaps and greater marriage stability. In order to address this 
issue, we control for spouses’ similarity in a number of dimensions (religion, nationality, 
country of birth, education, etc.). We also show that the dynamic evolution of happiness gaps 
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is associated with a greater risk of divorce, which cannot be explained by the initial quality of 
the match. 
Reverse causality. We still need to rule out other alternative interpretations, such as that of 
reverse causality running from the expectation of a divorce in the near future to the happiness 
gap, for instance, if the marriage is ailing and the prospective divorce renders one spouse 
more unhappy than the other. We try to rule out this alternative interpretation using different 
methods. First, we control for lagged values of the happiness gap. Next, we consider the sub-
sample of couples who are already under observation in the survey in the first year of their 
marriage. We then estimate the effect of the absolute value of the happiness gap in the first 
year of marriage on the probability of ever divorcing in subsequent years, during the period of 
observation. Finally, we check that our results hold on the sub-sample of individuals who do 
not form a new union one year after their separation: the risk of reverse causality is lower than 
on the complementary sub-sample. 
Fairness versus relative concerns. A possible formulation of the importance of the 
happiness gap in terms of Figure 1 is that the subjective reference point of spouses, i.e. the 
benchmark to which they are comparing their well-being is not purely self-centered, but is the 
equal utility locus, defined as the intersection between the marriage utility frontier and the 45° 
line (point E). It could be that even when this situation does not realistically represent their 
outside option, it appears to them as a feasible and “fair” allocation. In this case, whenever the 
distribution of happiness moves too far from this point, the actual surplus of marriage is 
judged to be unsatisfactory (unfair?) by at least one spouse. The question then is whether this 
stems from a preference for equality in happiness, or from the relative deprivation of the less 
happy spouse. A simple way of disentangling the two interpretations is to look at symmetry: 
does the association of happiness gaps with divorce depend on whether it is the husband or 
the wife who is relatively less happy? If the effect is asymmetric (i.e. the relative happiness 
deprivation of one spouse, say women, is more destabilizing for the union than that of the 
other spouse (men)), we will interpret this as evidence of relative concerns (relative 
deprivation) rather than as a pure taste for equality in happiness..  
In addition, we also control for other determinants of divorce that have been uncovered in the 
empirical literature (see for instance Weiss and Willis, 1997), such as, for both spouses: 
objective and subjective health, duration of marriage, labor market status, work experience, 
years of schooling, numbers of working hours, months of previous unemployment, house 
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ownership, number of previous legal marriages and cohabitations, type of management of 
household budget, share of household work, the fact of having had divorced parents, health 
shocks, unemployment shocks, height, Body Mass Index, etc.  
4.2 Variables and specification  
As was explained in Section 3, we use self-declared happiness as a proxy for well-being and 
ex-post utility (see Kahneman et al., 1997). Over the past decade, the recourse to subjective 
measures of well-being has gained popularity, due to the availability of large-scale national 
surveys such as the British Household Panel Survey and the German Socio-Economic Panel, 
which are used in this paper, as well as international databases, such as the World Values 
Survey or the International Social Survey Programme. A considerable amount of work has 
gone into showing the robustness and validity of these measures (see the reviews by Frey and 
Stutzer, 2002; Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2006; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006; Clark et al., 
2008), as well as the stability of the structure of satisfaction across time and space (di Tella et 
al., 2003). 
Following the existing empirical literature (e.g. Becker et al., 1977; Bumpass and Sweet, 
1972; Smock et al., 1999; Weiss and Willis, 1997), XMt and XWt include the socio-
demographic variables that influence the value of being in marriage versus out-of-marriage 
(household income, education of spouses, children, duration of marriage), as well as variables 
that capture the potential threat points of each spouse (e.g. individual income, education, age, 
age difference between spouses). 
To avoid perfect collinearity between happiness variables, we have recourse to a nonlinear 
specification of the happiness gap between spouses. Our main specification consists of 
including the absolute value of the happiness gap between a respondent and her spouse, 
together with the total happiness gap. We also consider dummy variables that take the value 
one if self-declared happiness of the woman is greater (respectively lesser and equal) than that 
of her partner. This allows us to identify the sign of the effect. We estimate the various 
specifications of equations (1) and (2) on the pooled data of each national survey (separately), 
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using a probit model, where we cluster the standard errors by individual, in order to correct 
for the autocorrelation of observations that pertain to the same individual.10 
Of course, this exercise is based on the assumption that spouses compare their happiness 
levels, i.e. that they are able to observe the happiness level of their partner. It has indeed been 
shown (Sandvik et al., 1993) that the level of happiness declared by an individual is correlated 
with the level of happiness that her spouse perceives her to experience. To be safe, we run 
estimates that include the dynamic evolution of the happiness difference; this eliminates any 
misperception that could characterize a couple in an invariant way. 
5. Results 
We present the estimates of the association between happiness gaps and the likelihood of 
divorce, going from the more general specifications based on the whole sample to 
increasingly demanding assumptions that correspond to sample restrictions. 
5.1 Happiness gaps increase the likelihood of divorce…but in an asymmetric 
way 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the estimates corresponding to the basic specification, i.e. 
considering that the value of the outside option is captured by the controls (equation (1.i)). 
Controlling for the total level of happiness of a couple (as well as for age, age difference 
between spouses, education of spouses, the duration of the union, the number of children and 
log real household income), a 1 unit increase in the absolute value happiness gap between 
spouses raises the probability of separation by 0.23 in Germany (GSOEP), 0.2 in Australia 
(HILDA) and 0.08 in the United Kingdom (BHPS). This represents a non-negligible share of 
the average risk of breaking-up, which is about 2%. 
                                                 
10 Another possibility would be to use a duration model. Sueyoshi (1995) has shown that a much simpler logit or 
probit model with period-specific variables yields similar results; we thus introduce year dummies in a 
robustness specification. Kraft and Neimann (2009) use a complementary log-log model with a marriage 
duration specific dummy variable, which is perfectly equivalent to a discrete-time proportional hazard model, 
but is better suited to the analysis of rare events like divorce. In a working paper version of this article, we 
checked that our results are maintained with this specification.  
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The effects of the other controls are consistent with the existing literature: the probability of 
divorce decreases with the (log) total real household income and with the age of the spouses, 
but increases with the age difference (female – male). The association between the number of 
children and marriage stability is negative in the GSOEP and insignificant in the two other 
data sets. 
The coefficient on the happiness gap is less precisely estimated in the BHPS. This is because, 
as is shown in Panel B of Table 2, the effect is particularly asymmetric in Great Britain. 
Indeed, the lesson of Panel B is that happiness gaps are only associated with divorces when 
they are unfavorable to the woman! More generally, all of the specifications based on dummy 
variables that capture the sign of the happiness difference reveal that the effect of happiness 
gaps is entirely driven by relatively less happy women. In all three countries, a situation in 
which the woman is unhappier than her partner increases the risk of separation in the 
following year by about 0.5 (as compared to a situation in which both partners report the same 
level of happiness). For cohabitating couples, the risk is ten times higher (this result is not 
reported in Table 2, but is available from the authors on request).  
The asymmetry also holds when controlling for alternative definitions of the outside options 
(see below). This naturally leads to the question of whether divorce is actually initiated by 
women when they are unhappier than their husband. In the 2005, 2006 and 2007 waves, the 
Australian survey contains retrospective information on the person who initiated the 
separation. The findings are impressive: 60% of separated women report that they were 
responsible for the decision to separate. Only 16% of women attribute the responsibility to 
their husband, and 24% declare that the separation was initiated by both spouses. In Germany, 
a study of the Ministry of the Family, carried out in 2003, reports that about two thirds of 
divorces are initiated by women (quoted by Kraft and Neimann, 2009).11 We also checked 
that in the Australian survey, women who reported to have initiated the divorce were actually 
less happy than their husbands.12 In contrast, when the decision to divorce was taken by both 
spouses or by the husband, chi2 tests do not  reject the null hypothesis of equal satisfaction of 
                                                 
11 The same evidence is reported by Brinig and Allen (2000) in the case of the United States. 
12 Their average level of happiness was 6.89 (0.30), versus 7.7 (0.21) for their husband, and the difference is 
significant at the 5% level (chi2 test = 0.0104). 
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spouses. This is consistent with the idea that  divorces tend to be initiated by women not only 
because they are unhappy, but also because they are less happy than their husband.  
What are the reasons for the asymmetric effect of happiness gaps? Are women more subject 
to happiness comparisons? Do they attach more importance to the couple as a spillover 
mechanism? Or do they expect more from their marriage than men, as opposed to other 
domains of life? We are unable to answer this question using the available data. We tried but 
failed to observe a correlation between divorce and unequal amounts of housework or child 
care (see Section 5.4). One possible explanation is that exit conditions are more favorable to 
women, due to the divorce legislation concerning alimony, financial transfers and child 
custody (see Clark, 1999; Rasul, 2006; Rasul and Matoushek, 2008). With only three surveys 
concerning relatively similar countries, it is difficult to trace the impact of legislation on 
divorce decisions. However, if this explanation is valid, this means that relative concerns are 
important and influence individual behavior when the context permits it. 
Importantly, the asymmetry of the relationship between happiness gaps and divorce allows us 
to distinguish between two different interpretations. It suggests that the effect of happiness 
gaps stems from relative concerns (relative deprivation), rather than from a pure preference 
for equality in happiness: otherwise women would also initiate divorce when they are happier 
than their partner. 
Table 2 about here. 
5.2 Happiness gaps increase the likelihood of separations, even when marital 
surplus is positive  
Table 3 (Panels A and B) presents results for specification (ii) of equation (1).13 It shows the 
coefficient on the happiness gap, controlling for total marital surplus, defined as the difference 
between an individual’s current happiness and the mean satisfaction of singles of the same 
                                                 
13 We only use specification (iii) in subsequent tables when we impose conditionality linked to the definition of 
marital surplus. Indeed, simply including the mean happiness of separated people, three years after their break-
up, in the regression cannot change the coefficient of the happiness gap, as this variable takes the same value for 
all individuals, by definition. 
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age and gender. In Panels A and B of Table 3, the coefficient on the happiness gap remains of 
the same order of magnitude as in the basic specification. 
Table 3 about here 
Table 4 presents estimates of specifications (ii) and (iii) of equation (1) for couples whose 
total surplus is positive. Thus it estimates the impact of the happiness gap under the 
assumption that utility is perfectly transferable between spouses, and that the rate of exchange 
is the same both in and out of marriage (utility frontiers don’t cross). The results are similar to 
those in Table 3, and the same is true of estimates based on the even more restricted sample of 
couples where both members experience a higher current utility than in their outside option 
(Table 5), although several coefficients are not well determined under this restriction. Hence, 
regardless of whether utility is transferable or not (and regardless of whether the utility curves 
intersect or not), couples where female happiness is lower than male happiness are more at 
risk of breaking up in the following year. These results suggest that happiness gaps do matter 
as such. 
Table 4 and 5 here 
Finally, Table 6 presents estimates of the impact of an increase in happiness gaps on the 
restricted sample of couples whose utility has increased over a period of three years. Even for 
spouses whose self-declared happiness has increased over time, the enlargement of the 
happiness gap remains a statistically significant predictor of separation in the following year 
(except for Great Britain). This dynamic specification shows that the effect of the happiness 
gap goes beyond the initial quality of the marriage, and hence cannot be totally explained by 
assortative mating (see Section 5.6).  
5.3 Robustness  
Table 10 shows that the coefficient on the happiness gap remains statistically significant when 
a series of additional controls are introduced into the regressions separately. Table 11 displays 
the coefficients on these factors.  
The most remarkable (but classical, e.g. Weiss and Willis, 1997) result is that the risk of 
divorce increases with female individual income but falls with male individual income. Other 
factors that increase the risk of divorce include male and female unemployment (BHPS and 
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GSOEP), longer working hours of the woman (relative to her partner) and the parents of the 
woman being divorced.  
Factors that decrease the risk of divorce are: a higher age at marriage (which is usually taken 
to capture the length of the search, hence the quality of the marriage), spouses being born in 
the same country, sharing the same religion, owning their house (GSOEP, HILDA), a high 
level of importance of the family declared by the woman, and, of course, high individual 
happiness levels of both partners, satisfaction with one’s spouse and a good subjective mental 
health. The effect of education on marriage stability is not stable, conformingly to the 
literature, which posits an a priori ambiguous effect.14 
Although our specification already tries to take into account the potential wedge between the 
actual and expected happiness levels of spouses, we attempted to control for some specific 
exogenous shocks that are likely to destabilize a marriage. Famous examples include shocks 
to the expected earning capacity of a spouse (Weiss and Willis, 1997), job losses, or health 
shocks (Charles and Stephens, 2004). We therefore checked that introducing shocks to the 
income and health status of each spouse did not change the order of magnitude of the 
coefficient on the happiness gap. Neither disability shocks nor firm closures were statistically 
significantly associated with the probability of breaking-up. These additional controls did not 
change the magnitude of the coefficient on the happiness gap (Tables 10 and 11). 
In order to further explore the role of shocks, i.e. the difference between expectations and 
realizations, we used a series of questions from the GSOEP about respondents’ current life 
satisfaction (1), their expected life satisfaction in five years’ time (2) and their expected life 
satisfaction in one year’s time (3) (answers from 0 ‘completely dissatisfied’ to 10 ‘completely 
satisfied’). We included, alternatively, the difference between current happiness (question 1) 
and 5-year lagged expected future happiness (question 2); and the difference between current 
happiness (question 1) and one-year lagged expected happiness (question 3). This test can 
also be seen as another possible definition of the outside option of spouses as being the 
                                                 
14 More education makes an individual financially less dependent on her spouse, but on the other hand, it 
increases the non-monetary gain from marriage due to the valuable characteristics of this person, as well as 
reducing the chance that her expectations concerning marriage were false, because of her higher intelligence 
(Kraft and Neimann, 2009). 
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happiness expectations that they formed in the past. As is shown in Table 7, including these 
additional controls in the main specification did not change our main result. Hence, even 
though shocks may affect the stability of marriage, they are not sufficient to explain away the 
impact of happiness gaps. 
In terms of econometric specification, we also checked that the results were essentially 
unchanged in a complementary log-log specification, as well as in a rare events logit 
specification. In addition, we checked that the results were similar when the German sample 
(GSOEP) was restricted to West Germans. As a measure of the happiness gap, we replaced 
the absolute value of the happiness difference with the ratio of wife’s/husband’s happiness, or 
of the happier to the unhappier spouse. We also replicated all of our results using the post-
estimation residual happiness (including the usual controls, as defined in equation (1)) instead 
of the happiness level (see Powdthavee, 2009). The results were essentially unaltered. Due to 
space constraints, we do not display these robustness tests.  
Finally, Table 8 runs the basic estimates of equation (1) using a variable available in all three 
surveys, which measures satisfaction with one’s partner rather than self-declared happiness. 
The results are as usual: when women are less satisfied with their partner than the reciprocal, 
the risk of marital dissolution is higher. 
5.4 Interactions  
Panel B of Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 showed that the effect of the happiness difference is driven by 
unhappier women. In addition, we found that the effect is typically several times higher for 
cohabitating couples than for legally married couples. For instance, in Germany, a 1 unit 
increase in the happiness gap raises the probability of separation by 0.16 for legally married 
couples, versus 0.5 for cohabitating couples. In Australia, a 1 unit increase in the happiness 
gap raises the probability of a break-up by 0.2 for legally married couples, versus 0.9 for 
cohabitating couples. Accordingly, when we introduced a dummy variable for legally married 
(versus de facto) couples, the coefficient on this dummy was always statistically significantly 
negative (at the 1% confidence level), and varied from –2 percentage points (GSOEP and 
BHPS) to –5 percentage points (HILDA). The greater fragility of cohabitating couples, as 
compared to legally married ones, is a common observation in the literature. Brien et al. 
(2006), for instance, document this relationship using a longitudinal survey of American 
women, and interpret it in the framework of matching under uncertainty: couples who are 
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more uncertain about the quality of their match may choose to cohabitate rather than marry, in 
order to acquire more information and incur lower costs in case of separation. 
In order to understand which couples are most concerned, we interacted the absolute value of 
the happiness gap with a large number of variables (controlling for the main effects of the 
latter). It turned out that few variables qualified the effect of the happiness gap significantly.15 
The statistical association between happiness gaps and the risk of divorce was particularly 
strong for higher levels of female income (GSOEP) and unemployed husbands (HILDA). It 
was weaker for women who declared that they attached a high importance to family (GSOEP, 
HILDA), to a good partnership (BHPS) or to religion (HILDA), and also for couples with 
longer marriage durations (HILDA, BHPS).  
Among the interactions that were not statistically significant, let us mention female and male 
levels of happiness, an increase in the happiness gap over the three last years, male income, 
female unemployment, same nationality, same religion, divorced parents (although this was 
negative for males in HILDA), the number of previous marriages, and the presence of 
children in the household (distinguishing several age categories).Among the factors that 
magnified the impact of happiness gaps on the risk of separation, we found higher female 
income and higher number of worked hours.  
5.5 Ruling out reverse causality 
We interpret the effect of happiness gaps on the probability of separation as expressing a 
concern for relative happiness. However, we need to rule out alternative interpretations, such 
as reverse causality, i.e. the expectation of a break-up in the near future causing the happiness 
gap. Infidelity is likely to create such a situation, especially if one spouse is planning to 
dissolve her current relationship in order to form another couple with her new partner (South 
and Lloyd, 1995). We try to rule out this alternative interpretation using different methods.  
First, we estimate equation (1.i) on the three-year lagged value of the happiness gap. As is 
shown in Table 9 (first row), we do observe a statistically significant association with the 
probability of divorce in (t + 1). However, a break-up can be anticipated and can produce 
                                                 
15 Results are available from the authors on request. 
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asymmetric welfare effects on spouses a long time beforehand. To address this issue, we 
consider the sub-sample of couples who are already under observation in the survey in the 
first year of their marriage. We run equation (1.i) and look at the effect of the absolute value 
of the happiness gap in the first year of marriage on the probability of ever divorcing in 
subsequent years, over the observation period. The second row in Table 9 shows that an initial 
happiness gap of 1 unit increases the probability of a break-up in the following years by about 
4 percentage points in the United Kingdom and Germany, and 2.3 percentage points in 
Australia. This represents between 7 and 15 percent of the average risk of separation observed 
in the surveys (see Section 3).16 Thus, we observe a statistically significant effect of happiness 
gaps in the first year of marriage, hence (hopefully) before separation is on the horizon. 
In order to go one step further, we once more use the panel nature of the surveys, which 
follow individuals when they move or break-up. We estimate the usual equation (1.i) both on 
the restricted sample of individuals who do not form a new couple one year after the 
dissolution of their union (row 4) and on those who do (row 5). The impact of the happiness 
gap turns out to be about ten times greater for couples who are not observed to be living with 
a new partner one year after they separate. This rules out the interpretation according to which 
it is the difference in the perspectives of the post-separation period that creates the happiness 
gap. 
5.6 Assortative mating 
The finding that happiness gaps, and in particular those which are already observable in the 
first year of marriage, are associated with a higher risk of divorce can be interpreted as a sign 
of assortative mating in terms of happiness baseline level. If well-being is not transferable, 
and happiness gaps matter per se, it is indeed efficient to choose a partner whose level of 
well-being is “naturally” on the same level as one’s own. This can happen either because 
happiness is a natural personality trait as such, or because the spouses have identical 
                                                 
16 The lower figure for Australia may be due to the fact that in Australia, de facto couples enjoy exactly the same 
rights as married couples after one year of cohabitation. Hence, the selection effect of couples who decide to get 
legally married is certainly high. The average risks of divorce that we calculate depend on the time span of the 
surveys. 
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preferences, which leads them to choose similar actions and reach similar levels of “primary” 
happiness (before any redistribution).  
The economic theory of marriage predicts a “predominance of positive assortative mating 
with respect to personal characteristics such as education, height, intelligence, age, property 
income, physical attractiveness, etc. […] all traits which are not good substitutes in the 
production of commodity income, while negative assortative mating would be optimal for 
substitutes, such as wage earning power” (Becker et al., 1977, p. 1146). This prediction has 
been confirmed by several empirical studies (e.g. Lehrer and Chiswick, 1993; Contoyannis 
and Jones, 2004; Kalmijn, 1994; Kalmijn et al., 2005). As an illustration, Weiss and Willis 
(1997) found evidence that couples with similar levels of schooling are more likely to marry 
and less likely to divorce. Likewise, similarities in terms of age, region of origin, ethnicity, 
religion, and social background, have been found to be associated with longer durations of 
marriages (see Frimmel et al., 2009 for a review), an observation that is confirmed in our 
surveys (see Section 5.3).  
Matching could also happen along the dimension of well-being. Some psychologists (Lykken 
and Tellegen, 1996; Headey and Wearing, 1992, Cummins et al. 2008) have suggested that 
individuals are characterized by a “setpoint” (or baseline-level) of happiness, considered as a 
type of personality trait, partly determined by genetics. In this view, individuals can deviate 
from their baseline-level following shocks, but will eventually return to this level after a 
process of adaptation. Fujita and Diener (2005) and Lucas and Schimmack (2006), and more 
recently Headey et al. (2010), have questioned the relevance of this homeostasis theory: using 
the GSOEP, they found that individual self-declared happiness fluctuates significantly over 
time, and is less stable than other objective health measures such as body mass index, or 
systolic and diastolic blood pressure. 
We do find some signs of assortative mating in our three datasets. The happiness levels of 
spouses are positively correlated, as has been established in the literature, in particular by 
Powdthavee (2004) and Lucas and Schimmack (2006). We compared the distribution of the 
happiness gaps of actual couples observed in the surveys with that of randomly matched 
singles aged 18–55. Figure 2 shows that whereas over 30% of actual partners stand on exactly 
the same happiness step, this is the case for only about 20% of randomly matched singles. 
Thus, the distribution of the happiness gap is slightly more balanced in the set of randomly 
matched couples. Admittedly, though, it is left-skewed and has a modal value of 1, which 
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certainly reflects the fact that self-declared happiness is quite concentrated at around 8 on the 
10 step scale in GSOEP and HILDA, and around 6 on the BHPS 8 step scale, as is shown in 
Figure A1 in the Appendix. 
Figure 2 about here  
However, assortative mating does not completely explain the effect of happiness gaps on 
divorce. First, we showed that the risk of future divorce is associated not only with the level 
of the happiness gap, but also with its evolution over time (Table 6); in this specification, the 
quality of the match is neutralized by the first difference. Second, we also showed that, after 
controlling for the lagged values of the happiness gap, or for the initial happiness gap in the 
first year of marriage (Table 10), the coefficient on the current happiness gap remains 
statistically significant in the estimates based on GSOEP and HILDA, and is of the same 
magnitude, although imprecisely estimated, in estimates based on BHPS,17 which again 
controls for the invariant part of individual happiness (if any). Third, in all three datasets we 
checked that the happiness gap between former spouses decreases over time after divorce 
(chi2 tests reject the null that the happiness gap is the same before divorce as two, three and 
four years after divorce, at the 1% level). However, admittedly, the happiness gap between 
former spouses always remains statistically significantly higher than that of couples who 
remain married (by a magnitude of 15% to 30%, depending on the dataset; the chi2 tests reject 
the null that the happiness gap is equal for divorced and married couples at the 1% level). 
Finally, if assortative mating is conducive to higher marital happiness, one should observe a 
decline in overall marital happiness as the happiness gap increases.18 Although we do find a 
negative correlation between the size of the happiness gap and the level of total happiness of a 
couple (see Figure 3), the interaction between the two measures is usually statistically 
insignificant. We also interacted the happiness gap with the happiness level of the unhappier 
spouse, and of either spouse, but the interactions were not statistically significant. Hence, the 
impact of the happiness gap on divorce is not driven by the low level of total happiness of the 
couple due to poor assortative mating in terms of happiness baseline-level.  
                                                 
17 Note that the correlation between the current and lagged values of the happiness gap is always less than 0.3. 
18 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this remark. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper offers new empirical evidence on the existence of relative happiness concerns in 
households. Keeping constant the aggregate level of happiness or marital surplus of a couple, 
a greater happiness difference between spouses reduces the stability of their union.  
This result is robust to the inclusion of a series of controls that are classically taken to 
determine the stability of marriage. We address the risk of reverse causation by showing that 
the risk of divorce is statistically associated with the happiness gap in the first year of 
marriage. This finding points to the potential importance of assortative mating. However, the 
effect of happiness gaps goes beyond assortative mating, as is shown by estimates that 
neutralize the invariant quality of the marriage. Moreover, we uncover an asymmetry in the 
effect of the happiness gap: the latter is only a cause of divorce in cases where the woman is 
unhappier than her spouse. Our interpretation of these findings is that there is a concern for 
the distribution of happiness in couples, a comparison of well-being levels that can cause 
women to initiate divorce proceedings. 
We try to show that our finding is not attributable solely to the non-transferability of utility; 
however, we do not exclude role of non-transferability, implying that couples which are not 
able to transfer and equalize spouses’ happiness levels are more at risk of divorce. In many 
versions of the popular cooperative model of household bargaining, partners are represented 
as taking decisions sequentially, in order to maximize their joint output (or aggregate welfare) 
and then share it between them. This interpretation rests on the assumption that utility is 
transferable, i.e., that the initial distribution of well-being across spouses is easily modifiable, 
exactly as primary income can in principle be modified by income redistribution by the state. 
However, it may prove difficult to transfer utility between spouses, i.e. to modify the primary 
distribution of happiness that results from their actions. This could explain why assortative 
mating in terms of happiness is associated with a greater stability of marriage (because 
spouses do not need to redistribute utility). This also suggests that when spouses “agree” ex 
ante on a very unequal distribution of welfare, this puts the durability of their marriage at risk. 
From this point of view, public policy should avoid giving spouses incentives that lead to 
diverging levels of happiness. Individual income and employment have been shown to be 
among the main determinants of happiness; policies that affect the division of labor inside the 
household should keep this in mind. 
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TABLE 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF COUPLES* (standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 BHPS (1996–2007) GSOEP (1984–2007) HILDA (2001–2007) 
Same partner in next period:   Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Number of observations 28702 594 107627 2038 19598 546 
Female Happiness (BHPS: 1–7; 
others: 1–10) 5.31 (1.22) 4.58 (1.4) 7.10 (1.78) 6.41 (1.99) 8.04 (1.49) 7.35 (1.88) 
Male Happiness 5.27 (1.17) 4.70 (4.58) 7.07 (1.76) 6.48 (1.96) 7.94 (1.47) 7.43 (1.84) 
Total happiness 10.58 (1.90) 9.28 (2.26) 14.17 (3.14) 12.60 (3.57) 16.22 (2.25) 14.98 (2.67) 
Happiness gap (female – male) 0.05 (1.44) –0.12 (1.67) 0.04 (1.65) –0.31 (2.22) 0.13 (1.89) –0.02 (2.20) 
|Happiness gap| 1.04 (1.00) 1.28 (1.08) 1.08 (1.25) 1.55 (1.55) 1.10 (1.16) 1.52 (1.51) 
Age female 43.36 (11.5) 34.46 (9.8) 46.9 (14.3) 43.0 (17.1) 43.9 (17.9) 34.8 (14.7) 
Age male 45.76 (12.19) 36.79 (10.12) 48.5 (14.3) 42.5 (16.0) 43.6 (17.8) 37.2 (15.3) 
Log household income 7.95 (0.64) 7.81 (0.63) 7.74 (0.49) 7.66 (0.49) 5.82 (0.63) 5.68 (0.67) 
Log individual female income  6.57 (1.13) 6.68 (1.03) 2.50 (0.71) 2.58 (0.72) 4.84 (1.22) 4.67 (1.31) 
Log individual male income  7.34 (1.02) 7.13 (1.08) 3.29 (0.55) 3.18 (0.56) 5.39 (1.23) 5.19 (1.24) 
Number of children (< 16 years old) 0.80 (1.03) 1.13 (1.11) 0.83 (1.08) 0.59 (0.87) 1.83 (1.48) 1.47 (1.56) 
Household size 3.21 (1.17) 3.42 (1.20) 3.13 (1.22) 2.90 (1.14) 2.92 (1.46) 2.87 (1.56) 
Paid employment female (%) 0.62 (0.48) 0.63 (0.48) 0.55 (0.49) 0.56 (0.49) 0.58 (0.49) 0.59 (0.50) 
Paid employment male (%) 0.66 (0.47) 0.64 (0.48) 0.73 (0.44) 0.74 (0.41) 0.71 (0.46) 0.76 (0.43) 
Unemployed female (%) 0.02 (0.13) 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22) 0.07 (0.25) 0.03 (0.17) 0.07 (0.25) 
Unemployed male (%) 0.03 (0.18) 0.10 (0.30) 0.05 (0.22) 0.08 (0.28) 0.04 (0.19) 0.05 (0.22) 
Years of schooling female 10.18 (1.16) 10.21 (0.93) 11.3 (2.46) 11.3 (2.32) 12.44 (2.64) 12.21 (2.65) 
Years schooling male 10.09 (1.16) 10.11 (0.99) 11.8 (2.68) 11.8 (2.43) 12.82 (2.57) 12.47 (2.27) 
Duration of marriage (if 1st 
marriage) 21.5 (12.5) 13.2 (8.5) 25.0 (15.71) 17.9 (15.84) 22.6 (15.42) 14.5 (12.07) 
Legally married (%) 0.84 (0.36) 0.53 (0.50) 0.91 (0.29) 0.65 (0.48) 0.84 (0.37) 0.56 (0.50) 
Female less happy than male (%) 0.32 (0.47) 0.40 (0.49) 0.30 (0.46) 0.40 (0.46) 0.29 (0.46) 0.38 (0.49) 
Female more happy than male (%) 0.36 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48) 0.32 (0.47) 0.29 (0.49) 0.37 (0.48) 0.35 (0.48) 
Both equally happy (%) 0.32 (0.47) 0.24 (0.43) 0.39 (0.46) 0.31 (0.45) 0.34 (0.47) 0.27 (0.45) 
Female’s satisfaction with partner 6.24 (1.17) 4.58 (2.08) 8.01 (1.74) 6.83 (2.40) 8.31 (2.03) 6.09 (3.09) 
Male’s satisfaction with partner 6.35 (1.06) 5.23 (1.82) 8.13 (1.61) 6.99 (2.22) 8.50 (1.92) 6.34 (3.17) 
|Gap in satisfaction with partner|  0.77 (1.07) 1.56 (1.51) 0.97 (1.21) 1.50 (1.62) 1.07 (1.41) 1.90 (1.99) 
Total satisfaction with partner 43.36 (11.50) 34.46 (9.77) 16.18 (2.94) 13.99 (3.83) 17.16 (3.02) 13.61 (4.78) 
*Each observation is a couple, defined as a woman with her characteristics and that of her partner. 
 
 
TABLE 2. HAPPINESS GAPS INCREASE THE RISK OF DIVORCE.  
 
Basic specification of equation (1). Estimating the probability of separation, controlling for total marital 
surplus, with definition (i) of the outside option Ui0  as being the same for identical values of Xt: 
Separation t + 1 = f [ (UAt + UBt), |UAt – UBt| , XAt, XBt, It]  (1.i) 
Panel A. Estimates of the probability of breaking-up in (t + 1) 
  BHPS GSOEP HILDA 
 Coefficient (T statistics) 
|Happiness difference| t 0.081 (1.55) 0.228 (7.98) 0.278 (3.77) 
Total happiness t –0.387 (13.21) –0.215 (16.41) –0.325 (8.00) 
Age wife –0.105 (15.70) –0.019 (4.99) –0.101 (12.22) 
Age difference 0.039 (2.89) –0.012 (1.23) 0.092 (3.76) 
Education female –0.068 (1.17) 0.065 (3.08) –0.117 (2.54) 
Education male –0.086 (1.37) –0.034 (1.71) –0.029 (0.63) 
Number of children 0.010 (0.18) –0.358 (7.02) 0.113 (1.41) 
Log total real household income t –0.158 (1.60) –0.463 (4.74) –0.576 (3.25) 
Pseudo R2/ Log likelihood 0.1092 0.0337 0.0872 
Number observations 29296 98171 19389 
Marginal effects (*100) are displayed, with T statistics in parentheses. Cluster (individual). 
 
Panel B. The asymmetric effect of happiness gaps. Probit estimates of the probability of breaking-up in (t + 1) 
 BHPS GSOEP HILDA 
 Coefficient (T statistics) 
Female happiness < Male happiness 0.407 (2.64) 0.497 (5.4) 0.550 (2.22) 
Female happiness > Male happiness 0.142 (0.97) 0.031 (0.3) 0.286 (1.23) 
Pseudo R2 
Number of observations 
0.1102 
29296 
0.0374 
98171 
0.0850 
19389 
Marginal effects (*100) are displayed, with T statistics in parentheses. Cluster (individual).  
Other controls are as in Panel A. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3. HAPPINESS GAPS INCREASE THE RISK OF DIVORCE. 
 
Estimating the probability of a separation, controlling for total marital surplus, using definition (ii) of outside 
option Ui0 : 
- Probability of separation t + 1 = f [ (UAt + UBt) – (UA0 + UB0), |UAt – UBt| , XAt, XBt, It]   (1) 
- (ii): Ui0 is the self-declared happiness of singles of the same age and gender as individual i in the survey.  
Panel A. Probit estimates of a separation in (t + 1) 
Definition of outside option Ui0 : (ii) Mean LS of 
all singles in same age and gender  BHPS GSOEP HILDA 
 Coefficient (T statistics) 
Coefficient on |Happiness difference| t  0.799 (1.50) 0.227 (8.00) 0.345 (4.24) 
Pseudo R2 
Number of observations 
0.1093 
29296 
0.0380 
98171 
0.0778 
19389 
The marginal effects of |UAt – UBt| (*100) are displayed. Cluster (individual). The other controls are as in 
Table 2. 
 
 
Panel B. The asymmetric effect of the happiness gap. Probit estimates of a separation in (t + 1) 
Definition of outside option Ui0: (ii) Mean LS of all 
singles in same age and gender BHPS GSOEP HILDA 
 Coefficient (T statistics) 
    
Female happiness < Male happiness 0.416 (2.64) 0.311 (2.94) 0.667 (2.40) 
Female happiness > Male happiness  0.144 (0.96) 0.006 (5.56) 0.003 (1.23) 
Pseudo R2 
Number of observations 
0.1103 
29296 
0.0364 
98171 
0.0748 
19389 
The marginal effects (*100) are displayed, with T statistics in parentheses. Cluster (individual). The other 
controls are as in Table 2. 
 
 
 
TABLE 4. HAPPINESS GAPS INCREASE THE RISK OF DIVORCE EVEN WHEN MARITAL 
SURPLUS IS POSITIVE 
 
Estimating the probability of separation, controlling for total marital surplus and restricting the sample to 
positive total surplus.  
 Separation t + 1 = f [ (UAt + UBt) – (UA0 + UB0), |UAt – UBt| , XAt, XBt, It]  (1) 
 with                    (UAt + UBt) > (UA0 + UB0) (condition 1) 
 
Panel A. Probit estimates of a separation in (t + 1) 
Coefficient on |Happiness difference| t 
 BHPS GSOEP HILDA 
Definition of U i0 
↓ Coefficient (T statistics) 
(ii) Mean LS of all singles in same age and gender 0.157 (2.59) 0.155 (3.61) 0.383 (3.31) 
Pseudo R2 
Number of observations 
0.093 
21712 
0.0214 
56018 
0.0555 
12713 
(iii) Mean LS 3 years after breakup 0.258 (3.49) 0.192 (6.00) 0.325 (3.58) 
Pseudo R2 
Number of observations 
0.099 
16661 
   0.0443 
   64367 
0.0704 
15673 
The marginal effects of |UAt – UBt| (*100) are displayed. Cluster (individual). The other controls are as in 
Table 2. 
 
Panel B. The asymmetric effect of the happiness gap. Probit estimates of a separation in (t + 1) 
 BHPS GSOEP HILDA 
Definition of Ui0 
↓ Coefficient (T statistics) 
(ii) LS of all singles in same age and gender    
Female happiness < Male happiness 0.413 (2.83) 0.177 (2.07) 0.702 (2.39) 
Female happiness > Male happiness 0.132 (0.98) 0.0473 ( 0.58) –0.002 (–0.01) 
Pseudo R2 
Number of observations 
0.0938 
21712 
0.0582 
56018 
0.0536 
12713 
(iii) LS three years after breakup    
Female happiness < Male happiness 0.511 (2.79) 0.345 (3.89) 0.577 (2.35) 
Female happiness > Male happiness 0.329 (2.05) 0.076 (0.90) 0.154 (0.67) 
Pseudo R2 
Number of observations 
0.0983 
16661 
0.0414 
64367 
0.0678 
15673 
The marginal effects (*100) are displayed. Cluster (individual). The other controls are as in Table 2. 
 
 
TABLE 5. HAPPINESS GAPS INCREASE THE RISK OF SEPARATION EVEN WHEN 
INDIVIDUAL MARITAL SURPLUS IS POSITIVE. 
 
Estimating the probability of separation, controlling for total marital surplus and restricting the sample to 
positive marital surplus for each spouse. 
 
Separation t + 1 = f [ (UAt + UBt) – (UA0 + UB0), |UAt – UBt| , XAt, XBt, It]  (1) 
 
with                   UAt > UA0 and UBt > UB0.      (condition 2) 
 
Panel A. Probit estimates of a separation in (t + 1) 
Coefficient on |Happiness difference| t    
Definition of Ui0 
↓ BHPS GSOEP HILDA 
 Coefficient (T statistics) 
(ii) Mean LS of all singles in same age and gender 0.239 (2.49) 0.135 (3.07) 0.398 (2.11) 
Pseudo R2 
Number of observations 
0.0715 
17887 
0.0237 
39509 
0.0388 
8485 
(iii) Mean LS 3 years after divorce 0.170 (1.43) 0.120 (2.43) 0.141 (1.79) 
Pseudo R2 
Number of observations 
0.1461 
8244 
0.0446 
58319 
0.1357 
10939 
The marginal effects of |UAt – UBt| (*100) are displayed. Cluster (individual). The other controls are as in 
Table 2. 
 
Panel B. The asymmetric effect of the happiness gap. Probit estimates of a separation in (t + 1) 
Definition of Ui0 
↓ BHPS GSOEP HILDA 
 Coefficient (T statistics) 
(ii) Mean LS of all singles in same age and gender    
Female happiness < Male happiness 0.278 (1.79) 0.209 (1.76) 0.729 (1.93) 
Female happiness > Male happiness 0.133 (0.96) 0.052 (0.40) 0.241 (0.74) 
Pseudo R2 
Number of observations 
0.0700 
17887 
0.0231 
39509 
0.0382 
8485 
(iii) LS three years after breakup    
Female happiness < Male happiness 0.252 (1.49) 0.185 (2.13) 0.291 (1.73) 
Female happiness > Male happiness 0.146 (1.06) 0.047 (0.59) 0.052 (0.36) 
Pseudo R2 
Number of observations 
0.1464 
8244 
0.0446 
58319 
0.1062 
10939 
The marginal effects are displayed. Cluster (individual). The other controls are as in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 6. DYNAMICS: A WIDENING OF THE HAPPINESS GAP INCREASES THE RISK OF 
DIVORCE. 
 
Estimates of equation (2):  
Probability of divorce t +1 = f [ UAt + UBt, (|UAt – UBt| – |UAt – 3 – UBt – 3|) , XAt , XBt, It]       (2) 
 
Conditional on                     UAt ≥ UAt – 3 and UBt ≥UBt – 3     (condition 3) 
Probit estimates of a separation in (t + 1) 
Coefficient on ↓ BHPS  GSOEP HILDA 
 Coefficient (T statistics) 
|UAt – UBt| – |UAt – 3– UBt – 3| 0.031 (0.27) 0.172 (2.87) 1.329 (2.69) 
Pseudo R2 
Number of observations 
0.0804 
6801 
0.0156 
30572 
0.1391 
755 
The marginal effects of (|UAt – UBt| – |UAt – 3– UBt – 3|) *100 are displayed. Cluster (individual).  
The other controls are as in Table 2. 
 
 
TABLE 7. TAKING FORMER EXPECTATIONS AS THE VALUE OF THE OUTSIDE OPTION. 
Probit estimates of the risk of separation in t + 1. Basic specification (1.i), GSOEP survey 
Coefficient on |Happiness difference| t GSOEP 
 
Definition of outside option Ui0 
↓ 
 
Equation (1) 
 
Condition 1 
 
Condition 2 
 Coefficients (T statistics) 
Expected happiness next year as of t – 1 0.279 (4.06) 0.221 (2.29) 0.271 (2.06) 
Expected happiness in 5 years as of t – 5 0.312 (6.57) 0.191 (2.70) 0.173 (1.50) 
The marginal effects (*100) are displayed, with T statistics in parentheses. Cluster (individual). Each 
cell corresponds to a separate regression. The other controls are as in Table 2.  
Expected happiness next year is only available in years 1984–1987. Expected happiness in 5 years’ 
time is available in 1990–2004.  
 
TABLE 8. ROBUSTNESS: SATISFACTION WITH PARTNER INSTEAD OF SATISFACTION WITH 
LIFE 
Probit estimates of the risk of separation in t + 1. Basic specification (1.i)  
 BHPS GSOEP HILDA 
 Coefficient (T statistics) 
Female satisfaction with partner < Male 
satisfaction with partner 0.303 (2.58) 0.700 (1.74) 1.322 (5.49) 
Female satisfaction > Male satisfaction with 
partner –0.138 (1.1 6) 0.536 (1.41) 0.839 (3.29) 
Pseudo R2 
Number of observations 
0.2060 
27973 
0.0413 
6039 
0.0898 
18021 
The marginal effects are displayed (*100). Cluster (individual). The other controls are as in Table 2.
 TABLE 9. RULING OUT REVERSE CAUSALITY.  
Probit estimates of a separation in (t + 1). Estimates of equation (1) with specification (i), as in Table 1. 
Coefficient on ↓ BHPS GSOEP HILDA 
 Coefficient (T statistics) 
Coef. on 3 years lagged |Happiness difference| t – 3 0.115 (1.68) 0.096 (2.72) 0.285 (2.98) 
Pseudo R2 
Number of observations 
0.0888 
13133 
0.0298 
67945 
0.0655 
7713 
Coef. on |Happiness difference| in the first year of 
marriage on probability of ever divorcing 3.959 (2.06) 2.846 (2.15) 2.307 (2.36) 
Pseudo R2 
Number of observations 
0.0352 
653 
0.0553 
899 
0.0504 
731 
Coef. on |Happiness difference| t  
for those who do not form a new union in t + 1 0.070 (1.42) 0.195 (8.75) 0.267 (3.64) 
Pseudo R2 
Number of observations 
0.1081 
29240 
0.0565 
99735 
0.0819 
20491 
Coef. on |Happiness difference| t  
for those who do form a new union in t + 1 0.010 (0.71) 0.009 (2.02) 0.019 (3.67) 
Pseudo R2 
Number of observations 
0.0804 
28758 
0.0687 
97685 
0.1153 
19375 
The marginal effects are displayed (*100). Cluster (individual). The other controls are as in Table 2. 
 
 
TABLE 10. ROBUSTNESS: ADDITIONAL CONTROLS AND ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS — 
COEFFICIENT ON THE HAPPINESS GAP. 
Probit estimates of a separation in (t + 1). Estimates of equation (1) with specification (i), as in Table 2 
Coef on |Happiness Gap| BHPS GSOEP HILDA 
Controlling for: Coefficient (T statistics) 
Happiness gap in 1st year of marriage* 0.098 (1.26) 0.217 (2.21) 0.535 (2.49) 
Shocks    
Serious injury to wife NA NA 0.288 (3.95) 
Serious injury to husband NA NA 0.179 (2.35) 
Wife victim of psychical violence NA NA 0.249 (3.52) 
Husband victim of psychical violence NA NA 0.190 (2.56) 
Wife victim of property crime NA NA 0.287 (3.98) 
Husband victim of property crime NA NA 0.197 (2.58) 
Wife detained in jail NA NA 0.285 (3.94) 
Husband detained in jail NA NA 0.1919 (2.52) 
Wife fired NA NA 0.288 (3.97) 
Husband fired NA NA 0.187 (2.48) 
Wife’s firm closure NA 0.236 (8.26) NA 
Husband’s firm closure NA 0.1942 (8.51) NA 
Wife’s disability  0.236 (8.23) 0.295 (4.00) 
Husband’s disability  0.195 (8.54) 0.199 (2.59) 
    
Other specifications     
Year fixed effects 0.0778 (1.52) 0.243 (8.49) 0.294 (4.27) 
Happier/unhappier partner instead if |happiness gap|t 0.0349 (0.43) 0.441 (7.78) 0.325 (2.15) 
    
*This result is different from that in Table 4: this table displays the coefficient on the |happiness gap|t 
The marginal effects are displayed (*100). Cluster (individual). The other controls are as in Table 2. 
 
 
 
TABLE 11. ROBUSTNESS: PROBIT ESTIMATES OF A SEPARATION IN (t + 1) —  
COEFFICIENTS ON ADDITIONAL CONTROLS 
Probit estimates of a separation in (t + 1). Estimates of equation (1) with specification (i), as in Table 2 
Coefficient on each additional control (introduced 
separately) 
BHPS GSOEP HILDA 
  Coefficient (T statistics) 
Female income 
Male income  
(instead of household income) 
0.138 (2.15) 
–0.138 (–3.19) 
0.169 (2.08) 
–0.396 (3.87) 
0.147 (0.54) 
–0.298 (1.42) 
Total happiness squared 
1st line: linear term; 2nd line: quadratic term 
–0.417 (2.56) 
0.002 (0.18) 
–0.247 (4.26) 
0.002 (0.50) 
–0.181 (1.93) 
0.003 (0.97) 
Female unemployed 0.935 (2.36) 2.629 (15.52) 0.601 (1.08) 
Male unemployed 0.759 (2.51) 0.442 (2.51) 2.224 (3.51) 
Owner of one’s house –0.861 (5.20) –0.804 (9.24) –1.480 (5.53) 
Same nationality –1.028 (3.24) –0.823 (4.17) –0.318 (1.31) 
Same religion –0.291 (1.35) 3.407 (29.16) –1.587 (7.49) 
Both immigrants –0.136 (0.23) –1.245 (8.19) –0.035 (0.21) 
Parents of wife divorced NA NA 1.194 (3.70) 
Parents of husband divorced NA NA 0.419 (0.26) 
Female’s satisfaction with partner –0.611 (–20.42) –0.320 (4.30) –0.135 (5.94) 
Male’s satisfaction with partner –0.572(–15.38) –0.191(2.93) –0.0428 (1.92) 
Dealing with household finance   NA 
Each spouse manages her money separately NA omitted NA 
Female manages money, partner receives portion NA –0.185 (0.42)  
Male manages money, partner receives portion NA –1.211 (2.75)  
All money shared NA –1.782 (4.70)  
Part of money shared, part kept separate NA –0.424 (0.98)  
Importance of family to female –0.347 (–3.00) –1.133 (4.88) –0.137 (1.73) 
Importance of family to male –0.270 (–1.94) –.943 (5.56) –0.040 (0.67) 
Female fired NA  –0.129 (0.46) 
Male fired NA  0.663 (2.53) 
Female’s firm closure NA –0.290 (0.66) NA 
Male’s firm closure NA –0.353 (0.90) NA 
Female’s disability NA –0.261 (1.85) –0.123 (1.02) 
Male’s disability NA 0.180 (1.48) 0.342 (2.58) 
The marginal effects are displayed. Cluster (individual). The other controls are as in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. UTILITY FRONTIERS. 
 
  
 
 
FIGURE 2. THE DISTRIBUTION OF HAPPINESS GAPS. 
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FIGURE 3. TOTAL LIFE SATISFACTION AND THE ABSOLUTE VALUE OF THE HAPPINESS 
GAP. 
 
BHPS GSOEP HILDA 
   
APPENDIX 
FIGURE A1. THE DISTRIBUTION OF SELF–DECLARED HAPPINESS. 
 
BHPS. How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with life as a whole? (scale: 1–7) 
  
GSOEP. How satisfied are you with life as a whole? (scale: 0–10) 
 
HILDA. How satisfied are you with life as a whole? (scale: 0–10) 
 
 
